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The Legislative Council, which is composed of five 
Senators, six Representatives, and the presiding officers 
of the two houses, serves as a continuing research agency 
for the legislature through the maintenance of a trained 
staff. Betwee.n ,sessions, research activities are concen-
trated on the study of relatively broad problems formally 
proposed by legislators, and the publication and distri-
bution of factual reports to aid in their solution. 
During the sessions, the emphasis is on supplying 
legislators, on individual request, with personal memo-
randa, providing them with information needed to handle 
their own legislative problems. Reports and memoranda 
both give pertinent data in the form of facts, figures, 
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To Members of the Forty-seventh Colorado General 
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and recommendations pertaining to matters of 
fiscal policy. 
The report of the Committee appointed to 
carry out this study was accepted by the Legis-
lative Council for transmission with recommenda-
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tee by individuals or groups representing more than 
a score of agencies or organizations interested in 
matters of fiscal policy and upon studies conducted 
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FOREWORD 
The Fiscal Policy Committee, appointed originally in 1968, 
was re-$ppointed in 1969 for a two-year period pursuant to the 
p~qvJ$ions of House Joint Resolution No. 1034. Those appointed 
to the Committee and now serving on it are: 
Sen. Leslie R. Fowler 
Chairman 
Rep. Thomas Neal 
Vice Chairman 
Sen. Allen Dines 
Sen. William S. Garnsey, III 
Sen. Harry Locke 
Sen. J. D. Macfarlane 
Rep. Thomas Grimshaw 
Rep. Kathryn Munson 
Rep. Jerry Rose 
During the interim soon coming to an end, the Committee has 
focussed attention on matters which appeared to be deserving of 
consideration by the General Assembly in its 1970 Session. Speci-
fically, there have been four areas of special concern to the 
Committee, namely, ways and means of aiding political subdivisions 
in the financing of capital construction, strengthening of voca-
tional education programs, separation of the administrative and 
judicial functions of property tax law and related considerations, 
and the wisdom of making certain changes in the Public School 
Foundation Act. Proposals pertaining to the first three of these 
items are set forth in subsequent sections of this report; it was 
finally decided that experience to date with the Public School 
Foundation Act is insufficient to warrant proposing any changes 
in it at this time. 
Many individuals and groups appeared before the Committee 
in the course of its deliberations. Included among them are rep-
resentatives of the following: State Department of Education; 
Colorado Tax Commission; Legislative Drafting Office; State Board 
for Community Colleges and Occupational Education; Colorado Asso-
ciation of Commerce and Industry; Council on Educational Develop-
ment; Colorado Association of School Boards; Colorado State 
Association of County Commissioners; Colorado Public Expenditure 
Council; Colorado Assessors' Association; Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company; Jefferson County School District R-1; 
Colorado Municipal League; Colorado Cattlemen's Association; 
Bosworth, Sullivan and Company, Inc.; Dawson, Nagel, Sherman and 
Howard; Willson and Lamm. The Committee expresses its apprecia-
tion for the contributions of all those who participated in the 
discussions. 
Fitzhugh Carmichael and Dwight Heffner, Legislative Council 
Staff, had the principal staff responsibility for the preparation 
of the Committee report. 
December, 1969 
vii 
Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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FINANCING CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION 
FOR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS 
The primary method by which political subdivisions of 
Colorado finance capital improvements is through the issuance of 
bonds. For most political subdivisions, including the public 
schools, this means general obligation bonds which require a 
mill levy against property to pay the interest on the bonds·and 
to retire the principal over an extended period of time.· Towns 
cities and some special districts are permitted to issue revenu~ 
bonds to finance capital improvements and the revenues derived 
from such improvements are utilized to retire the debt. In most 
instances, the issuance of either general obligation or revenue 
bonds requires the approval of the electorate, and in the case 
of general obligation bonds only the taxpaying electorate may 
vote on the question. 
Either by constitution or by statute, the state imposes 
limits on the amount of bonded indebtedness that a political sub-
division may incur and the rate of interest that may be paid. 
Developments Affecting the Stability of Bonds 
Two recent developments have had a substantial effect upon 
the salability of school, special district and other municipal 
bonds in the state. First, two recent decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court have cast doubt upon the legality of bonds 
approved only by property taxpaying electors in Colorado (see 
Appendices A and B). In the cases of Kramer v. Union Free School 
District No. 15 et al. (New York) and Cipriano v. City of Houma 
et al. (Louisiana), the court held that statutory provisions 
which limited the franchise in local bond elections to property 
taxpayers were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
Neither of the above mentioned cases concerned general 
obligation bonds, though the Cipriano case did involve revenue 
bonds. However, by inference, many bond attorneys felt that the 
decisions had cast doubt upon the legality of restricting the 
vote on bond issues to taxpaying electors regardless of the type 
of bonds concerned. On November 17, 1969, the United States Dis-
trict Court in Arizona rendered its decision in the case of 
Kolodziejski v. City of Phoenix et al. This decision concerned 
revenue and general obligation bonds. The court held that the 
rule in Cipriano does apply to general obligation bond elections, 
saying that "we find no evidence which would justify a distinc-
tion between Revenue Bonds and General Obligation Bonds" (see 
Appendix C, p. 48). Thus, Arizona's constitutional and statutory 
provisions which limit the franchise in local bond elections to 
property taxpayers only were held also to be in violation of the 
. 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, 
bond attorneys in Colorado have indicated that they will no long-
er approve for sale new bond issues which have been approved at 
elections in which such qualifications prevailed. 
The second major development has been the rapidly increas-
ing interest rates on municipal bonds which, for high quality 
bonds (according to the Bond Buyer's twenty-bond index), reached 
an all-time high of 6. 37 percent as of 1September 5, 1969. This 
may be compared with the January 1965 rate of 4.85 percent. Two 
causes of the increases have been identified. First, tight money 
policies of the Federal Reserve Board have been promulgated to 
control inflation and are expected to continue for some time. 
Second the pro~osed tax reform bill in the United States Con-
gress {HR 13270} contained provisions which would t:iave made the 
interest income on heretofore tax-free bonds taxable. An in-
crease of three-fourths of a percentage point in the bond inter-
est rate during the period July 1 -- September 5, 1969, has been 
attributed to the introduction of the bill. The Finance Commit-
tee of the Senate has acted recently to delete these provisions 
btit the issue as of this date (December 5, 1969) remains unset-
tled. 
The combination of these factors, and the existence, in 
most cases, of a six percent limitation on the allowable interest 
rate on school and other municipal bonds in Colorado have pro-
duced what many consider to be a crisis situation in regard to 
the financing of local capital construction. Rising interest 
rates have led bond-issuing authorities to resort to short matur-
ity schedules in order to market their securities within the in-
terest limitations imposed by statute. Others have been unable· 
to market them at all; available data indicate that the value of 
authorized local bond issues blocked from sale by market·condi-
tions as of October 3, 1969, amounted to approximately $20,250,000 
(see Appendix D). Similar data indicate that, in addition to the 
issues noted above which have already been authorized but remain 
unsold, a number of local authorities anticipate the approval of 
bond issues in upcoming elections; the market value of these to-
tal approximately $123,275,000 (see Appendix E). 
Possible Means of Alleviating the Problem 
The problem is thus identified as one which consists of 
two primary factors -- legal problems associated with taxpayer 
qualifications in local bond elections, and high interest rates 
which make it difficult to market school and other municipal 
bonds under existing state law. In the light of the trend toward 
an expanded role for the state in the financing of public educa-
tion, a difficult question presents itself as to the selection 
of an appropriate and effective approach to the problem. 
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In line with suggestions from bond attorneys~ public offi-
cials, and other interested persons, possible means of alleviating 
the problem were examined, including (among others) the following: 
(1) Remove (or raise) the six percent interest rate limi-
tations on: 
(a) School bonds 
(b) Other local government bonds 
(2) Authorize schools and local governments to issue 
bond anticipation notes 
(3) Remove statutory discounting prohibitions 
(4) (a) Provide for mandatory public sale of bonds 
(b) Authorize payment for financial advice 
(5) Make municipal bonds non-taxable in Colorado 
(6) Authorize a second vote (if necessary) to raise 
limit on bonds previously authorized at an elec-
tion 
(7) Remove taxpayer qualifications wherever it can 
be accomplished by statute 
(8) Provide for a dual ballot procedure 
(9) Increase the capital reserve levy authorization 
Recommendations 
Because of the two-part nature of the problem (noted above), 
the committee's recommendations are set forth below under headings 
which denote the respective aspects of the problem to which they 
apply. 
Voter Qualifications. In view of the Kramer and Cipriano 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court noted above, the com-
mittee feels that stuatuory changes are needed to enable all reg-
istered qualified electors to vote in local bond elections. To 
accomplish this, the committee recommends: 
(1) Removal of taxpayer qualifications for participation 
in local elections wherever this may be accomplished by statute, 
except in the case of the School Foundation Act. 
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(2) Provision for alternate balloting procedures to over-
come constitutional difficulties pertaining to voter qualifica-
tions in local bond elections. The recommended system would 
retain present provisions which call for an election by property 
taxpayers only. However, an alternate method would also be pro-
vided whereby a local governing body could choose to permit all 
registered qualified electors to vote in such elections. Either 
method could be chosen, but bond counsel would advise local au-
thorities to use both methods at one election (using separate 
balloting) in order to guarantee the legality of the obligations 
concerned. Before bond attorneys would approve an issue for sale, 
it would need the approval of both the taxpaying electors and all 
of the registered qualified electors (including taxpaying elec-
tors). 
In view of Colorado Constitutional requirements, such pro-
visions would be necessary for bond elections of school districts, 
municipalities and counties. When a court decision is rendered 
which relates specifically to Colorado law, one or the other of 
the two methods would become inoperative. 
Interest Rates. In order to deal effectively with the 
difficulties caused by the rapidly rising interest rates as dis-
cussed above, the committee recommends that: 
(1) All statutory interest rate limitations be removed on 
school and other local bonds, including refunding bonds. 
(2) Statutory provisions which place limitations upon, 
or which otherwise prohibit, the sale of bonds below par value be 
eliminated. 
(3) Payment for professional financial advice be'author-
ized. 
(4) Statutory provisions be enacted to permit a special 
election to increase the maximum interest rate on bonds when they 
have been authorized to be issued but have not been sold. 
(5) Provisions be adopted to provide for the public dis-
closure of information relating to the sale of school bonds. In 
particular, the committee recommends (a) Whenever school bonds 
are sold, the board of the district selling the same shall cause 
to be prepared and filed with the state department of education, 
within ten days after said sale, a report setting forth a des-
cription of the bond issue, the applicable interest rate or rates, 
including the net effective interest rate, other terms of the 
sale, and applicable statistical, comparative bond market data, 
ratings, and indices relative to prevailing market conditions 
prior to and at the time of said sale, (b) One or more copies of 
said report shall be retained on file at the administrative head-
quarters of the district; and a copy thereof shall be made avail-
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able upon written request to any officer or representative of any 
organization of Colorado school districts. 
(6) Interest from obligations of Colorado or its politi-
cal subdivisions be exempt from state income tax. Such exemp-
tions should apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
1969. 
With respect to the recommendations for removal of inter-
est rate limitations on local bonds and for permitting a special 
election to increase interest rate limitations on bonds previous-
ly authorized, the committee also recommends that provisions be 
included which would require the proposal submitted to the elec-
torate to state the maximum "net effective interest rate" at 
which the bonds are to be sold. 
"Pay-As-You-Go" Financing of Capital Construction 
Another source of capital construction financing for 
schools has been the two mill capital reserve levy. It has been 
found that funds derived from this levy are generally utilized 
for minor construction and maintenance purposes. For these pur-
poses, this approach is seen as preferable to expensive long-term 
bond financing. 
Some districts, however, have viewed such funds as a highly 
useful source of "pay-as-you-go" financing for the construction 
of major facilities. Jefferson County School District R-1, for 
example, has indicated that substantial savings have been realized 
in this manner. A district official ha~ pointed out that the 
county utilized over $8,325,000 in capital reserve funds for the 
construction of new school buildings over the past ten years. It 
has been estimated that, if this amount had been financed by means 
of long-term obligations, interest payments would have exceeded 
$4,800,000. 
Statutory towns and cities have likewise been permitted to 
establish a "capital improvements fund" to be financed by an ad 
valorem tax. A levy not to exceed two -mills for such a fund is 
permitted without submitting the question to a vote. Amounts in 
excess of two mills are permissible if approved by "a vote of the 
taxpayers." 
However, the purposes for which towns, cities, and counties 
may use such funds are quite restricted. Thus, 139-78-3, Colorado 
Revised Statutes 1963 {1969 Supp.), states that such funds may be 
provided and accumulated for the purpose of constructing "public 
buildings or additions thereto, or to supplement bond issues for 
the same purpose." The resolution which establishes the fund must 
also set forth a description of the building or building~ to be 
constructed and the proposed location of the project. 
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In this regard, it should be noted that Colorado towns, 
cities and counties have been faced with the same difficulties in 
financing capital construction needs as those which trouble the 
schools. Attention has been directed to the especially difficult 
problems that these units have had in financing water and sewer 
facilities. Because such facilities are constructed and main-
tained for the benefit of the public, it would appear that they 
could properly be financed in the same manner as are schools and 
other public buildings. In fact, any facilities constructed and 
used for public benefit appear to constitute proper objects for 
funding by means of the capital reserve levy. 
Recommendations 
In view of the considerations discussed above, the commit-
tee recommends that the provisions of 139-78-3 and 36-3-2, Colo-
rado Revised Statutes 1963 (1969 Supp.), be amended to include 
"public buildings, water facilities, sewer facilities, or other 
public works," as purposes for which capital improvements funds of 
towns, cities, and counties may be created. 
The committee also recommends that the provisions of the 
statutes cited above be amended to specifically state that (1) 
such funds "may be accumulated and held over for expenditure in 
subsequent years," and (2) "the revenues derived from the opera-
tion of any public works or facilities, in excess of operating 
expenses and in excess of any amounts necessary to pay obliga-
tions required to be paid out of income from such public works or 
facilities, shall be credited to a separate account in the public 
works fund. Such revenues may be accumulated and held over for· 
expenditure in subsequent years, but they shall be used only for 
the public works from whose operation the revenues were derived." 
The committee also wishes to assure that local development 
of sewage treatment facilities will be consistent with comprehen-
sive planning for the state and that such development will in no 
way work to the detriment of state water pollution control ef-
forts. Therefore, it is further recommended that the following 
provisions be adopted: "No sewage treatment facility which will 
affect any stream within the state shall be constructed until the 
coordinator of state planning has certified that the construction 
of such facility will be consistent with comprehensive planning 
for the state, and the water pollution control commission has ap-
proved the location of such facility." 
In order to provide "pay-as-you-go" financing capabilities 
consistent with those of towns, cities and counties, the committee 
recommends that public school and junior college districts be 
authorized an additional property tax levy of two mills for capi-
tal construction purposes. Such a levy, to be used for financing 
projects specifically approved by a vote of the taxpaying electors, 
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would supplement the present capital reserve levy to yield a total 
capability of four mills on the assessed valuation of the school 
district. The approval of the taxpayers would be necessary only 
for levies in excess of two mills; present authority for these 
districts to establish a two-rnill levy without voter approval 
would remain unchanged. 
It is also recommended that all funds derived from such 
levies be permitted to accumulate and to be held over for expen-
diture in subsequent years. 
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VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
Areas of Progress: Identifying Needs 
Representatives of the State Board for Community Colleges 
and Occupational Education, the Council on Educational Develop-
ment. (COED), and the Colorado Association of School Boards have 
indicated that encouraging progress has been made in the state's 
junior colleges with respect to vocational education. This pro-
gress has been explained in several ways. First, reference is 
made to an increase in the number of students served by vocation-
al education programs. It has been noted that, prior to the 
creation of the state board in 1967, approximately 18.2 percent 
of Colorado's two-year-college students were classified as voca-
tional or technical students. A recent study, however, indicates 
that in the spring of 1969, the overall enrollment in vocational 
programs in the state's two-year colleges was approximately 31 
percent. In the state svstem community colleges, 42 percent of 
the students were classified as vocational. 
Progress has also been viewed in terms of program emphasis. 
That is, attention has been directed to past criticisms of voca-
tional education programs for their emphasis upon home economics 
and vocational agriculture courses. The state board has pointed 
out, however, that in the 1970-71 budget request, yet to be sub-
mitted, only 4.8 percent of the proposed expenditures are for 
vocational agriculture. They note further that this figure is a 
"lesser percentage than is represented in the labor force of Colo-
rado by agriculture.•• The board has also called attention to the 
fact that, for the same period, budget requests for home economics 
courses will total approximately 6.5 percent. Health, business 
and office, distributive education, and trades and industries 
are described as the major programs in vocational education. 
There is also some indication that efforts are being made 
to promote improved use of facilities through sharing and through 
a maximum time-spread of use. 
Finally, it has been pointed out that, with the 1968 amend-
ments to the Federal Vocational Act of 1963, disadvantaged, handi-
capped, and special needs students have received special attention. 
Attention has been called, however, to the need for more 
adequate funding of vocational programs in the secondary schools. 
To demonstrate this need, the state board has noted that it has 
been forced to discontinue payments for vocational equipment and 
that the rate of reimbursement for vocational programs in secon-
dary schools has dropped from 43 percent in 1966 to 28 percent in 
1969. There is, according to the board, no evidence that addi-
tional non-earmarked funds derived from the 1969-1970 state foun-
dation program have led to an increase in vocational programs. 
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In fact, the board has indicated that the lack of additional 
funds has caused some programs in the planning stage to be drop-
ped or postponed. 
The Council on Educational Development (COED} has pointed 
out that approximately 75 percent of the students now enrolled 
in Colorado junior and senior high schools will seek employment 
within a period of one year after the anticipated date of gradu-
ation. Only 20 percent of the pupils who start public schools 
will complete a baccalaureate degree. 
COED has also called attention to a survey conducted in 
1967 by the Vocational Guidance Division of the state board which 
indicated that 75 percent of the students were interested in 
taking some vocational work before they left high school. In 
1967-68, however, of the 59,500 students enrolled in the 11th and 
12th grades in Colorado's 181 school districts, only 22 percent 
had an opportunity to participate in vocational education programs. 
This phenomenon may be explained by other data which indi-
cate that only 97 of Colorado's 181 school districts, or approxi-
mately 54 percent of them, now offer vocational education in-
struction. Also, less than five percent of Colorado's state edu-
cational expenditures for primary and secondary schools is directed 
to vocational education. 
It should be noted also that estimates indicate that 83 
percent of Colorado's work force are employed in occupations 
normally served by vocational education. These data suggest that 
the needs of a large majority of Colorado's public school stu-
dents are not being met by the present emphasis upon academic cur-
ricula. 
Recommendations - General 
In view of the available evidence, the committee agrees 
that the need for increased state support of secondary vocational 
education has been adequately established. Therefore, the com-
mittee recommends that the basic pro~ram proposed by COED, as it 
appears amended below, be adopted. Ihe proposal reads as follows: 
The State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational 
Education shall adopt rules and regulations, and commence develop-
ment of a state plan for vocational education to assure: 
(1) Each program must provide students with an 
entry level occupational skill. 
(2) The program should be of sufficient duration 
to provide entry level skills and related 
knowledge required by business and industry. 
-10-
(3) Eac~ program shall have a technical advisory 
committee which functions at the state, region-
al or local level to assist local schools in 
planning and operating their curricula. 
(4) The vocational program must be housed in appro-
priate facilities equipped to perform its func-
tion. Such facilities may be housed within or 
without the district, and need not necessarily 
be housed in buildings owned or operated by a 
school district. 
(5) There should not be unnecessary duplication of 
either facilities or staffing in any district 
or area schools involved in vocational programs; 
and sharing of facilities, where feasible, 
shall be mandated by the State Board. 
(6) The program must meet an employment potential 
found to exist by the state board's survey of 
employment opportunities. 
Recommendations Re Financing 
The committee recommends that the program be funded by ap-
propriations to the State Board for Community Colleges and Occu-
pational Education in an amount between six and ten million 
dollars to supplement other available moneys according to the 
following methods. 
Local Contribution. In order to encourage a sense of lo-
cal responsibility for meeting vocational educational needs, the 
state board shall administer a four-to-one matching formula for 
local participation as follows: The state shall match each dol-
lar of local contribution with four dollars of state funds until 
the local contribution reaches an amount equivalent to one-half 
mill on the valuation of the school district. No minimum 
contribution shall be required of the local district~ 
State Contribution. In order to minimize reliance on 
property taxation and to afford assured property tax relief to 
all Colorado school districts and to equalize vocational educa-
tional opportunity for all Colorado school children, the committee 
recommends that all actual costs of approved vocational education 
programs in excess of the proposed maximum one-half mill local 
contribution be reimbursed by the state board from funds appropri-
ated for the purpose. 
Distribution of Funds. In local school district claims 
for reimbursement for authorized vocational education programs, 






Vocational instructional and vocational super-
visory salaries, including retirement and 
travel. 
Instructional books and supplies for approved 
vocational programs. 
Equipment for vocational programs which has had 
approval before purchase from the occupational 
division of the State Board for Community Col-
leges and Occupational Education. 
Transportation costs when incurred to transport 
students from one school to another for the 
purpose of receiving instruction in a regular, 
on-going vocational program, and upon prior ap-
proval from the occupational division of the 
State Board for Community Colleges and Occupa-
tional Education. 
Payments. Payments under the provisions of this article 
shall in no way affect the amount of other state aid for which a 
school district may qualify. 
Use of Funds. The use of the state funds requested for 
vocational education should exclude capital construction, voca-
tional guidance, pre-vocational courses, pilot or exemplary pro-
grams, special classes for disadvantaged or handicapped students, 
and teaching of regular academic subject matter courses. 
Other Support. The exclusions noted above will be sup-
ported by local funds other than those appropriated for the local 
contribution and, when appropriate, federal vocational funds. 
Administration. The State Board for Co~nunity Colleges 
and Occupational Education shall be responsible for distributing 
any funds appropriated for this program, and shall have the au-
thority to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for the admin-
istration of the program. 
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PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATOR 
- TAX COURT 
Extensive committee consideration was given, during the 
1969 session of the General Assembly, to a proposed Tax Court 
bill. Because of problems which arose in the course of committee 
hearings, including those of setting up proper due process provi-
sions and the defining of responsibilities, it was decided to 
postpone action on it. In the meantime, a subcommittee of the 
Fiscal Policy Committee has prepared a proposal which, it is be-
lieved, meets the principal objections to earlier drafts. 
In developing this proposal, the subcommittee was actuated 
by the belief that the administrative function of assessment and 
assessment supervision should be separated from the quasi-judici-
al function of equalization and appeals and, as recommended by 
the Colorado Committee on Government Efficiency and Economy, that 
the administrative function should be the responsibility of a 
single administrator. 
Briefly, the committee recommends creation of (1) the divi-
sion of property taxation in the department of local affairs, the 
head of which would be the property tax administrator, and (2) a 
three-member property tax court, ~lso within the department of 
local affairs. The principal objectives of this recommendation 
are: 
(1) To provide the taxpayer with a means of obviating the 
necessity of resorting to the usual expensive civil court pro-
cess; 
(2) To provide the taxing authority with a sourca of 
remedy with respect to actions involving one or more property 
classes; and 
(3) To separate the administrative and judicial functions 
of property tax law. 
The effect of this would be to abolish the Colorado Tax 
Commission and, as indicated above, to establish the office of 
Tax Administrator and a Tax Court. 
The following excerpts from the proposed bill set forth 
the committee's recommendation pertaining to the duties, powers, 
and authority of the property tax administrator and the duties of 
the property tax court: 
"137-3-9. Duties, powers, and authority. (1) (a) It 
shall be the duty of the property tax administrator and he shall 
have and exercise authority: 
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(b) To value the property and plant of all public utili-
ties doing business in this state in the manner prescribed by 
law, and to prepare and furnish all forms required to be filed 
with him by public utilities; 
(c) To supervise the administration of all laws concerning 
the valuing of taxable property, the assessment of same, and the 
levying of property taxes; 
(d) To review the methods used by assessors in appraising 
and valuing taxable property in the several counties of the state, 
and the methods used by county boards of equalization in equaliz-
ing valuations for assessment; 
(e) To approve the form and size of all personal property 
schedules, forms, and notices furnished or sent by assessors to 
owners of taxable property, the form of all field books, plat and 
block books, maps, and appraisal cards used in the office of the 
assessor, and other forms and records used and maintained by the 
assessor, and to require exclusive use of such approved sched-
ules, books, maps, appraisal cards, forms, and records by all as-
sessors to insure uniformity; 
(f) To prepare and publish from time to time manuals and 
instructions concerning methods of appraising and valuing land, 
improvements, and personal property, and to require their use by 
assessors in valuing and assessing taxable property; 
(g) To prepare and furnish to assessors all forms re-
quired to be completed by them and filed with the property tax 
administrator; 
(h) To call, upon not less than ten days' prior notice, 
meetings of assessors at some designated place in the state, and 
upon reasonable notice, to call group or area meetings of two or 
more assessors." 
"137-3-25. Duties of the court. (1) (a) The property tax 
court shall perform the following duties, such performance to be 
in accord with the applicable provisions of article 16 of chapter 
3, C.R.S. 1963, as amended: 
(b) Adopt procedures of practice before, and review by, 
the court; 
(c) Hear appeals from orders and decisions of the proper-
ty tax administrator filed not later than thirty days after the 
entry of any such order or decision: 
(d) Hear appeals from decisions of county boords of equal-
ization filed not later than thirty days after the entry of any 
such decision; 
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(e) (i) Conduct hearings upon complaints filed by the 
property tax administrator, upon his own motion, or upon petition 
by any tax levying authority in this state, concerning: 
(ii) Valuations for assessment on one or more classes or 
subclasses of property; but such a hearing shall be conducted 
only if a reappraisal has not been conducted or ordered pursuant 
to the provisions of section 137-3-14, as amended; 
(iii) Alleged dereliction of duty on the part of·a countf 
assessor. 
(2) Complaints filed by the property tax administrator 
shall be advanced on the calendar and shall take precedence over 
other matters pending before the court." 
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THE PUBLIC SCHOOL FOUNDATION ACT 
Experience with the Public School Foundation Act of 1969 
is regarded as insufficient to warrant proposing any changes in 
it at this time. There was extensive committee consideration of 
the Act, however, wherein several unexpected difficulties were 
brought to the committee's attention. These difficulties are 
described briefly below: 
Language Difficulty. During committee consideration of 
the problem, two aspects of language difficulty were recognized. 
In the first place, because there was no attempt in the wording 
of the bill to set forth a listing of specific categorical pro-
grams, the school district boards of education were given greater 
freedom in the preparation of budgets than was apparently envi-
sioned by many supporters of it. In the second place, there is 
the definition of current expense in Section 2 (9) which excludes 
categorical support funds from it (such funds being construed by 
the Department of Education in its Rules for Administration of 
the Act -- II, 1 -- to exclude funds for categorical purposes 
contributed by the local school district), whereas in Section 19 
(1) of the bill the general fund budget authorized for a school 
district for the ensuing year is limited to the sum of certain 
amounts, one of which is 1tone hundred six percent of the current 
expense per pupil in average daily attendance entitlement budget-
ed for the current year multiplied by the estimated number of 
pupils in average daily attendance for the ensuing budget year." 
The effect of the latter consideration was to cause the six per-
cent increase to be applied to a base that is somewhat larger 
than that regarded by many supporters of the bill as being per-
missible. 
It should be noted that there is difference of opinion as 
to the desirability of making any change in the Act in regard to 
the above matters. The budgeting flexibility which is afforded 
the local district is believed by some to be undesirable and by 
others to serve a useful and necessary purpose. 
Six Percent Limitation. It has been suggested that limi-
tations on school district budgeting and expenditures be removed 
by repealing Sections 18 to 23 of the Act. As an alternative, it 
was suggested that Section 19 (1) and (2) be amended.to raise the 
amount by which budgeted current expense items may be increased 
from one hundred six percent to one hundred ten percent. 
Restricted and Nonrestricted Costs. Another matter of con-
cern relates to specific items of expense which are to be included 
in the restricted and the nonrestricted portion of school dis-
trict budgets. Two suggestions in particular were discussed by 
the committee. The first concerned a request that fixed PERA 
(Public Employee's Retirement Association) costs in excess of 6 
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percent of employees' salaries be moved from the restricted to 
the nonrestricted portion of the budget. 
The other item discussed in this regard was transporta-
tion costs. It was proposed that costs associated with all types 
of transportation for educational purposes be included in the 
nonrestricted portion of the budget. The Act presently provides 
that "the total cost of transporting pupils to and from school" 
only shall be included in that category. 
Small Attendance Centers. The date by which the state 
board of education must determine small attendance center enti-
tlements was also discussed. It was suggested that the date in 
Section 12 (4) of the Act be changed from the first day of Decem-
ber to the fifteenth day of December because of problems which 
have been encountered in obtaining district's reports by the 
required date. In this regard, the committee expressed the view 
generally that moving deadlines will not solve the problem. Al-
though the committee is making no recommendations regarding the 
foundation act, the suggestion has been made that the Department 
of Education be requested to review reporting deadlines and de-
termine what action would be necessary in order to assure that 
they are met. 
Declining Districts. Attention has also been directed to 
the possibility that it may be necessary to provide relief for 
school districts which have experienced a decline in enrollment. 
It has been pointed out that enrollment decreases present diffi-
cult budgeting problems for small districts. The difficulty 
appears to lie with the distribution of the enrollment decreases; 
such decreases are commonly distributed among several grades so 
that no immediate adjustments may be made in teacher and/or facil-
ity requirements. 
Distribution of Benefits. The possibility that a number 
of smaller school districts will receive little or no benefits 
from the 1969 Act has also been noted. Further, the point has 
been made that some districts may be receiving less assistance 
under the provisions of the 1969 Act than under previous founda-
tion programs. 
The committee intends to study these possibilities during 
the next interim when more accurate information should be avail-
able. 
Taxpaying Electors. In order to increase the general fund 
budget of a district beyond the limits established in Section 19, 
Section 21 of the act provides that the local school district 
must obtain approval for such an increase from the "registered 
qualified taxpaying electors of the district." In conjunction 
with this requirement, subsequent sections of the act also contain 
references to "taxpaying'' electors. There was some feeling amon~· 
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members of the committee and other interested persons that such 
"taxpaying" qualifications should be del~ted. In this regard, it 
was pointed out that the Kramer and Cipriano decisions (noted 
above) suggest a possible trend toward the elimination of all tax-
paying qualifications for electors regardless of the issue to be 
decided. 
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ITEMS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The committee has agreed that an in-depth study should be 
conducted during the next interim of the problems of financing 
the capital construction needs of all units of state and local 
government in Colorado. Discussions in past committee meetings 
have suggested that there are a number of possibilities in the 
area of financing procedures which have not been adequately ex-
plored. 
The discussions have also demonstrated a need for consider-
ing possible revisions of articles X and XI of the state consti-
tution pertaining to revenue and public indebtedness. Such a 
study would be concerned with the modernization of state fiscal 
policies. 
It has also been suggested that the committee investigate 
the possibilities of a regional approach to the financing of state 
programs. The expectation is that substantial savings for the 
taxpayers might be realized by such an approach. 
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Appendix A 
No. 258.--0ctober Term, 1968. 
Morris H. Kramer, Appellant, On Appeal From the 
United States District 
v. Court for the Eastern 
District of New York 
Union Free School District 
No. 15 et al. 
LJune 16, 1969~7 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we are called on to determine whether§ 2012 
of the New York Education Law is constitutional. The legislation 
provides that in certain New York school districts residents who 
are otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections may 
vote in the school district election only if they (1) own (or 
lease) taxable real property within the district, or (2) are par-
ents (or have custody of) children enrolled in the local public 
schools. Appellant, a bachelor who neither owns nor leases tax-
able real property, filed suit in federal court claiming that§ 
2012 denied him equal protection of the law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. With one judge dissenting, a three-judge 
District Court dismissed appellant's complaint. Finding that i 
2012 does violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we reverse. 
I. 
New York law provides basically three methods of school board 
selection. In some large city districts, the school board is ap-
pointed by the mayor or city council. N.Y. Educ. Law §g 2553 (2), 
(4) (McKinney 1953) as amended (McKinney Supp. 1968). On the 
other hand, in some cities, primarily those with less than 125,000 
residents, the school board is elected at general or municipal 
elections in which all qualified city voters may participate. N.Y. 
Educ. Law ii 2502 (2), 2553 (3) (McKinney 1953). Cf. N.Y. Educ. 
Law§§ 2531 (McKinney 1953). Finally, in other districts such as 
the one involved in this case, which are primarily rural and sub-
urban, the school board is e1ected at an annual meeting of quali-fied school district voters. 
1rn some districts the election takes place on the Wednesday 
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The challenged statute is applicable only in the districts 
which hold annual meetings. To be eligible to vote at any annu-
al district meeting, an otherwise qualified2 district resident 
must either (1) be the owner or lessee of taxable real property 
located in the district, (2) be the spouse of one who owns or 
leases qualifying property, or (3) be the parent or guardian of 
a child enrolled for a specified time during the preceeding year 
in a local district school. 
Although the New York State Department of Education- has sub-
stantial responsibility for education in the State, the local 
school districts maintain significant con~trol over the adminis-
tration of local school district affairs. Generally, the board 
of education has the basic responsibility for local school oper-
ation, including prescribing the courses of study, determining 
the textbooks to be used, and even altering and equipping a for-
mer schoolhouse for use as a public library. N. Y. Educ. Law i 
1709 (McKinney 1953). Additionally, in districts selecting mem-
bers of the board of education at annual meetings, the local 
voters also pass directly on other district matters. For example, 
they must approve the school budget submitted by the school board. 
N. Y. Educ. Law§~ 2021, 2022 (McKinney 1953)4 Moreover, once 
following the district meeting. N.Y. Educ. Law§ 2013 (McKinney 
Supp. 1968). 
2The statute also requires that a voter be a citizen of the 
United States and at least 21 years of age. Appellant meets 
these requirements and does not challenge the citizenship, age or 
residency requirements of§ 2012. See infra, at_. Tne stat-
ute is set out in the Appendix, infra. 
3aut while the administration of schools and the formulation 
of general policies have been centralized in the State Education 
Department .•• the immediate control and operation of the schools 
in New York have to,a large extent been vested in the localities. 
The thousands of districts •.. possess a high degree of authority 
in education. They decide matters of local taxation for school 
purposes, elect trustees and other school officials, purchase 
buildings and sites, employ teachers and ... maintain discipline ... " 
Graves, Development of the Education Law in New York, 16 Consoli-
dated Laws of New York (Education Law) xxiii (McKinney 1953). See 
R. Pyle, Some Aspects of Education in New York 9-13 (1967). 
4 rn districts which do not have annual meetings, the budget is 
not submitted to district voters. Thus, in city districts where 
the board of education is elected by all the voters, the board has 
the power to set the budget and assess taxes to meet expenditures. 
In large city districts, where the board is appointed, the board 
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the budget is approved, the governing body of the villages with-
in the school district must raise the money which had been de-
clared "necessary for teachers' salaries and the ordinary contin-
gent expenses [of the schooly." N. Y. Educ. Law i 1717 (McKin-
ney 1953).5 The voters also may "authorize such acts and vote 
for such taxes as they shall deem expedient ... for equipping for 
library use any former schoolhouse .. .. fan1J for the purchase of 
land and buildings for agricultural, athletic, playground or so-
cial center purposes .... " N. Y. Educ. Law§ 416 (McKinney 1953). 
Appellant is a 31-year-old college-educated stockbroker who 
lives in his parents' home in the Union Free School District No. 
15, a district to which i 2012 applies. He is a citizen of the 
United States and has voted in federal and state elections since 
1959. However, since he has no children and neither owns nor 
leases taxable real property, appellant's attempts to register 
for and vote in the local school district elections have been un-
successful. After the school district rejected his 1965 appli-
cation, appellant instituted the present class action challenging 
the constitutionality of the voter eligibility requirements. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York denied appellant's request (made purusuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2281) that a three-judge district court be convened, and grant-
ed appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's complaint. Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 259 F. Supp. 164 (D.C.E.D.N.Y. 
1966). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed, ruling appellant's complaint warranted convening a 
three-judge court. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15. 
379 F. 2d 491 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1967). On remand, the three-judge 
court ruled that§ 2012 is constitutional and dismissed appel-
lant's complaint. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. i 1253, appellant filed 
a direct appeal with this Court; we noted probable jurisdiction. 
393 U.S. 818 (1968). 
must submit requests to the city government, much as would any 
other city de~artment. R. Pyle, Some Aspects of Education in New 
York 11 (1967). 
5The legislation provides that the money shall be raised 
through a "tax to be levied upon all the real property in the .•. 
village .... '' And, "the corporate authorities shall have no power 
to withhold the sums so declared to be necessary .... " N. Y. Educ. 
Law~ 1717 (McKinney 1953). 
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II. 
At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue 
in this case. The requirements of§ 2012 that school district 
voters must (1) be citizens of the United States (2) be hon~ fide 
residents of the school district, and (3) be at least 21 yea~s of 
age are not challenged. Appellant agrees that the States have 
the power to impose reasonable citizenship, age and residency re-
quirements on the availability of the ballot. Cf. Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89,91 (1965); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 
(1904). The sole issue in this case is whether the additional 
requirements of§ 2012--requirements which prohibit some district 
residents who are otherwise qualified by age and citizenship from 
participating in district meetings and school board elections--
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State shall 
deny persons equal protection of the laws. 
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances 
of the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, 
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classifi-
cation." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). And, in 
this case,¼ we must give the statute a close and exacting examina-
tion. "LSJince the right to exercise the franchise in a free 
and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and 
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citi-
zens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." 
Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S., 533, 562 (1964). See Williams v. 
Rhodes, supra, at 31; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 {1964). 
This careful examination is necessary because statutes distribut-
ing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative 
society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may 
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public 
officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government. 
Thus, state apportionment statutes, which may dilute the ef-
fectiveness of some citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from 
this Court. Reynolds v. Sims, supra. See Avery v. Midland Coun-
.!Y, 390 U.S. 494 {1968). No less rigid an examination is appli-
cable to statutes den¥ing the franchise to citizens who are other-
wise qualified by residence and age.6 Statutes granting the fran-
chise to residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of 
6This case presents an issue different from the one we faced 
in McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, --U.S.--
(1969) .. The present appeal involves an absolute denial of the 
franchise. In McDonald, on the other hand, we were reviewing a 
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denying some citizens any effective voice in 1he governmental af-
fairs which substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a , 
challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona 
fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the 
franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclu-
sions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. See 
Carrington v. Rash. supra, at 96. 
And, for these reasons, the deference usually given to the 
judgment of legislators does not extend to decisions concerning 
which resident citizens may participate in the election of legis-
lators and other public officials. Those decisions must be care-
fully scrutinized by the Court to determine whether each resident 
citizen has, as far as is possible, an equal voice in the selec-
tions. Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny 
some residents the right to vote, the general presumption of con-
stitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional ap-
proval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a 
"rational basis" for the distinctions made8 are not applicable. 
statute which made casting a ballot easier for some who were un-
able to come to the polls. As we noted, there was no evidence 
that the statute absolutely prohibited anyone from exercising the 
franchise: at issue was not a claimed right to vote but a claimed 
right to an absentee ballot. Id., at . · -· -
7of course, the effectiveness of any citizen's voice in govern-
mental affairs can be determined only in relationship to the power 
of other citizens' votes. For example, if school board members 
are appointed by the mayor, the district residents may effect a 
change in the board's membership or policies through their votes 
for the mayor. Cf. N.Y. Educ. Law §ij 2553 (2). (4) (McKinney 
1953). Each resident's formal influence is perhaps indirect, but 
it is equal to that of other residents. However, when the school 
board positions are filled by election and some otherwise quali-
fied city electors are precluded from voting, the excluded resi-
dents, when compared to the franchised residents, no longer have 
an effective voice in school affairs. This is precisely the sit-
uation with regard to the size the school budget in districts 
where i 20l2 applies. Seen. 4, supra. 
Bsee, e.g., McGowan v. Mar0land, 366 U.S. 420 425-428 (1961): Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358.S. 522, 527 (1959~; Kotch v. Board 
of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). 
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See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "ra-
tional" classifications in other types of enactments9 are based 
on an assumption that the institutions of state government are 
structured so as to represent fairly all the people. However, 
when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of 
this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the 
basis for presuming constitutionality. And, the assumption is no 
less under attack because the legislature which decides .who may 
participate at the various levels of political choice is fairly 
elected. Legislation which delegates decision-making to bodies 
elected by only a portion of those eligible to vote for the legis-
lature can cause unfair representation. Such legislation can ex-
clude a minority of voters from any voice in the decisions just 
as effectively as if the decisions were made by legislators the 
minority had no voice in selection.10 
The need for exacting judicial scrutiny of statutes distri-
buting the franchise is undiminished simply because, under a 
different statutory scheme, the officII subject to election might 
have been filled through appointment. States do have latitude 
in determining whether certain public officials shall be selected 
by election or chosen by appointment and whether various ques-
tions shall be submitted to the voters. In fact, we have held 
that where a county school board is an administrative, not leg-
islative body, its members need not be elected. Sailors v. Kent 
Bd. of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967). However, "once the 
tranchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn 
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 
9of course, we have long held that if the basis of classifica~ 
tion is inherently suspect, such as race, the statute must be 
subjected to an exacting scrutiny, regardless of the subject mat-
ter of the legislation. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n., 334 
U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 
(1948). . 
lOrhus, statutes structuring local government units receive 
no less exacting an examination merely because the state legisla-
ture is fairly elected. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 
474, 481, n. 6 (1968). 
11similarily, no less a showing of a compelling justifica-
tion for disenfranchising residents is required merely because 
the questions scheduled for the election need not have been sub-
mitted to the voters. 
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Fourteenth Amendment." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, su-
pra, at 665. 12 
Nor is the need for close judicial examination affected be-
cause the district meetings and the school board do not have 
"general" legislative powers. Our exacting examination is neces-
sitated not by the subject of the election; rather, it is required 
because some resident citizens are permitted to participate and 
some are not. For example, a city charter might well provide that 
the elected city council appoint a mayor who would have broad 
administrative powers. Assuming the council were elected consist-
ent with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause, the delega-
tion of power to the mayor would not call for this Court's exact-
ing review. On the other hand, if the city charter made the 
office of mayor subject to an election in which only some resident 
citizens were entitled to vote, there would be presented a situa-
tion calling for our close review. 
III. 
Besides appellant and other who similarly live in their par-
ents' homes, the statute also disenfranchises the following per-
sons (unless they are parents or guardians of children enrolled 
in the district public school): senior citizens and others living 
with children or relatives; clergy, military personnel and others 
who live on tax-exempt property; boarders and lodgers; parents 
who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose children 
a~e too young to attend school; parents who neither own nor lease 
qualifying property and whose children attend private schools. 
Appellant asserts that excluding him from participation in 
the district elections denies him equal protection of the law. 
He contends that he and others of his class are subst.antially in-
terested in and significantly .affected by the scho,ol meeting 
decisions. All members of the community have an interest in the 
quality and structure of public educati·on, appellant says, and 
he u~e-s that 11 the decisions taken by local boards •.. may have 
l2In Sailors v. Kent Bd. of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967), 
e-ach local school board sent one delegate to a biennial meeting 
at which the members of the county board of education were select-
ed .. We noted that "the choice of members of the county school 
board did not involve an election. 11 _lg., at 111. However, we 
also pointed out that the members of the local school boards, who 
in effect made the county board appointments, were elected, but 
that "no constitutional complaint /;ail :r;aised respecting that 
ell.:ection." Ibid. 
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grave consequences to the entire population." Appellant also 
argues that the level of property taxation affects him, even 
though he does not own property, as property tax levels affect 
the price of goods and services in the community. 
We turn therefore to question whether the exclusion is nec-
essafy to promote a compelling state interest. First, appel-
lees 3 argue that the State has a legitimate interest in limiting 
the franchise in school district elections to "members of the 
community of interest"--those "primarily interested in such elec-
tions." Second, appellees urge that the State may reasonably and 
permissibly conclude that "property taxpayers" (including lessees 
of taxable property who share the tax burden through rent pay-
ments) and parents of the children enrolled in the district's 
schools are those 11 primarily interested" in school affairs. 
We do not understand appellees to argue that the State is 
attempting to limit the franchise to those 11 subjectively con-
cerned" about school matters. Rather, they appear to argue that 
the State's legitimate interest is in restricting a voice in 
school matters to those "directly affected'' by such decisions. 
The State apparently reasons that since the schools are financed 
in part by local property taxes, persons whose out-of-pocket ex-
penses are "directly 11 affected by property tax changes should be 
allowed to vote. Similarly, parents of children in school are 
thought to have a "direct" stake in school affairs and are given 
a vote. 
Appellees argue that it is necessary to limit the franchise 
to those "primarily interested'' in school affairs because "the 
very increasing complexity of the many interacting phases of the 
school system and structure make it extremely difficult ~or the 
electorate fully to understand the whys and wherefores of the de-
tailed operations of the school system." Appellees say that 
many communications of school boards and school administrations 
are sent home to the parents through the district pupils and are 
"not broadcast to the general public''; thus, nonparents will be 
less informed than parents. Further, appellees argue, those who 
are assessed for local property taxes (either directly or indi-
rectly through rent) will have enough of an interest "through the 
burden on their pocket books to acquire such information as they 
may need." 
13The Union Free School District No. 15 and each member of its 
board of education were named as defendants. The Attorney Gener-
al of New York intervened as an appellee. 
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We need express no opinion as to whether the State in some 
circumstances might limit the exercise of the franchise to those 
"primarily interested" or "primarily affected." Of course, we 
therefore do not reach the issue of whether these particular 
elections are of the type in which the franchise may be so limit-
ed. For, assuming arguendo that New York legitimately might , 
limit the franchise in these school district elections to those 
"primarily interested in school affairs," close scrutiny of the 
i§ 2012 classifications demonstrates that they do not accomplish 
this purpose with sufficient precision to justify denying appel-
lant the franchise. 
Whether classifications alledgedly limiting the franchise to 
those resident citizens "primarily interested" deny those exclud-
ed equal protection of the law depends, inter alia, on whether 
all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or 
affected than those the statute includes. In other words, the 
classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of appel-
lant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articu-
lated state goal. 14 Section 2012 does not meet the exacting 
standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively 
distribute the franchise. The classifications in ij 2012 permit 
inclusion of many· persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect 
interest in school affairs and on the other hand, exclude others 
who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting de-
cisions.15 
Nor do appellees offer any justification for the exclusion 
of seemingly interested and informed residents--other than to 
argue that the i 2012 classifications include those "whom the 
state could understandably deem to be the most intimately inter-
ested in actions taken by the school board," and urge that "the 
task of ... balancing the interest of the community in the.mainten-
ance of orderly school district elections against the interest of 
any individual in voting in such elections should clearly remain 
with the legislature." But the issue is not whether the legis-
: 4of course, if the exclusions are necessary to promote the 
articulate state interest, we must then determine whether the in-
terest_promoted by limiting the franchise constitutes a compelling 
state interest. We do not reach that issue in this case. 
15~or example, appellant resides with his parents in the school 
district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested in and 
affected by school board decisions; however, he has no vote. On 
the other hand, an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no 
state or federal taxes, but who rents an apartment in the district 
can participate in the election. ' 
16we were informed at oral argument however that a very small 
proportion of the eligible voters atte~d the me~tings. 
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lative judgments are rational. A more exacting standard obtains. 
The issue is whether the i 2012 requirements do in fact suffici-
ently further a compelling state interest to justify denying the 
franchise to appellant and members of his class. The require-
ments of i 2012 are not sufficiently tailored to limiting the 
franchise to those "primarily interested" in school affairs to 
justify the denial of the franchise to appellant and members of 
his class. 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York is therefore reversed. The case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
APPENDIX TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 
Section 2012, New York Education Law: 
"A person shall be entitled to vote at any school meeting for the 
election of school district officers, and upon all other matters 
which may be brought before such meeting, who is: 1. A citizen 
of the United States. 2. Twenty-one years of age. 3. A resident 
within the district for a period of thirty days next preceeding 
the meeting at which he offers to ·vote; and who in addition there-
to possesses one of the following three qualifications: 
"(a) Owns or is the spouse of an owner, leases, hires, o~ is in 
the possession under a contract of purchase or is the spouse of 
one who leases, hires or is in possession under a contract of 
purchase of, real property in such district liable to taxation 
for school purposes, but the occupation of real property by a per-
son as a lodger or boarder shall not entitle such person ·to vote, 
or 
"(b) Is the parent of a child of school age, provided such a 
child shall have attended the district school in the district in 
which the meeting is held for a period of at least eight weeks 
during the year preceding such school meeting, or 
"(c) Not being the parent, has permanently residing with him a 
child of school age who shall have attended the district school 
for a period of at least eight weeks during the year preceding 
such meeting. No person shall be deemed to be ineligible to vote 
at any such meeting, by reason of sex, who has the other qualifi-
cations required by this section." 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom Mn. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. 
JUSTICE HARLAN join, dissenting. 
In Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, this 
Court upheld against constitutional attack a literacy requireraent 
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applicable to voters in all state and federal elections, imposed 
by the State of North Carolina. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS said: 
"The States have long been held to have broad powers 
to determine the conditions under which the right of suf-
ferage may be exercised, Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 
633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335, absent of 
course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns." 
360 U.S., at 50-51. 
Believing that the appellant in this case is not the victim of 
any ''discrimination which the Constitution condemns," I would af-
firm the judgment of the District Court. 
The issue before us may be briefly summarized. New York has 
provided that in certain areas of the State, local authority over 
public schools shall reside in "Union Free School Districts," 
such as the District involved here. In such areas, the qualified 
voters of the District annually elect members of a Board of Edu-
cation and determine by vote the basic fiscal policy of the school 
system: they adopt a budget and in effect decide the amount of 
school taxes that shall be imposed upon the taxable real property 
of the District. State and federal grants provide some addition-
al funds for the operation of the school system, but the only 
method by which the District itself may raise its own revenue is 
through such property taxes.I 
Three classes of persons are qualified under New York law to 
vote in these school elections: (1) parents or guardians of 
children attending public schools within the District; ( 2) per-
sons who own taxable real property within the District, and their 
spouses; and (3) persons who lease taxable real property ·within 
the District, and their spouses.2 The appellant, a bachelor who 
lives with his parents and who neither owns nor leases any real 
property within the District, falls within none of those classes, 
and consequently is disqualified from voting despite the fact 
that he meets the general age and residence requirements imposed 
by state law. The question presented is whether, by virtue of 
1The District Court's statement to this effect has been ex-
plicitly reiterated and emphasized by the appellees, and the pro-
position is apparently conceded by the appellant. See N. Y. Educ. 
Law ii 416, 1717, 2021; N. Y. Real Prop. Tax Law§§ 1302, 1306, 
1308. 
2New York's general age and residence requirements must also 
be met. 
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that disqualification, the appellant is denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws. 
Although at times variously phrased, the traditional test of 
a statute's validity under the equal protection clause is a fami-
liar one: a legislative classification is invalid only "if it 
rest.LsJ on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regu-
lation's objective~." Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 
330 U.S. 552, 556. It was under just such a test that the liter-
acy requirement involved in Lassiter was upheld. The premise of 
our decision in that case was that a State may constitutionally 
impose upon its citizens voting roquirements reasonably "designed 
to promote intelligent use of the ballot." 360 U.S., at 51. A 
similar premis4 underlies the proposition, consistently endorsed 
by this Court, that a State may exclude nonresidents from parti-
cipation in its elections. Such residence requirements, designed 
to help ensure that voters have a substantial stake in the out-
come of elections and an opportunity to become familiar with the 
candidates and issues voted upon, are entirely permissible exer-
cises of state authority. Indeed, the appellant explicitly con-
cedes, as he must, the validity of voting requirements relating 
to residence, literacy, and age. Yet he argues--and the Court 
accepts the argument--that the voting qualifications involved 
here somehow have a different constitutional status. I am unable 
to see the distinction. 
Clearly a State may reasonably assume that its residents 
have a greater stake in the outcome of elections held within its 
boundaries than do other persons. Likewise, it is entirely 
rational for a state legislature to suppose that residents, be-
ing generally better informed ~egarding state affairs than are 
nonresident~ will be more likely than nonresidents to vote 
responsibly. And the same may be said of legislative assump-
tions regarding the electoral competence of adults and liter-
3see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426: "The 
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification 
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the 
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted 
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in prac-
tice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it." 
4Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621; Lassiter v. Northamption 
Election·Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.~. 89, 
93-94, 96; see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
666. 
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ate persons on the one hand, and of minors and illiterates on the 
other. It is clear, of course, that lines thus drawn cannot in-
fallibly perform their intended legislative funct~on. Just as 
"LIJlliterate people may be intelligent voters," nonresi_dents 
or minors might also in some instances be interested, informed, 
and intelligent participants in the electoral process. Persons 
who commute across a state line to work may well have a great 
stake in the affairs of the State in which they are employed; 
some college students under 21 may be both better informed and 
more passionately interested in political affairs than many 
adults. But such discrepancies are the inevitable concommitant of 
the line-drawing that is essential to lawmaking. So long as the 
classification is rationally related to a permissible legislative 
end, therefore--as are residence, literacy, and age requirements 
imposed with respect to voting--there is no denial of equal pro-
tection. 
Thus judged, the statutory classification involved here seems 
to me clearly to be valid. New York has made the judgment that 
local educational policy is best left to those persons who have 
certain direct and definable interests in that policy: those who 
1 are either immediately involved as parents of school children or 
who, as owners or lessees of taxable property, are bu~dened with 
the local cost of funding school district operations. True, per-
sons outside those classes may be genuinely interested in the 
conduct of a school district's business--just as commuters from 
New Jersey may be genuinely interested in the outcome of a New 
York City election. But unless this Court is to claim a monopoly 
of wisdom regarding the sound operation of school systems in the 
50 States, I see no way to justify the conclusion that the legis-
lative classification involved here is not rationally related to 
a legitimate legislative purpose. "There is no group more inter-
ested in the operation and management of the public schools than 
the taxpayers who support them and the parents whose children 
attend them." Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 
(DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). 
With good reason, the Court does not really argue the con-
trary. Instead, it strikes down New York's statute by asserting 
that the traditional equal protection standard is inapt in this 
case, and that a considerably stricter standard--under which 
5Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S., at 52. 
6Presumably the rationale for including lessees and their 
spouses in the electoral process is that the cost of property 
taxes is in many instances passed on from owner to lessee. 
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classifications relating to "the franchise" are to be subjected 
to "exacting judicial scrutiny"--should be applied. But the as-
serted justification for applying such a standard cannot with-
stand analysis. 
The Court is quite explicit in explaining why it believes 
this statute should be given "close scrutiny": 
"The presumption of constitutionality and the approval 
given 'rational' classifications in other types of enact-
ments are based on an assumption that the institutions of 
state government are structured so as to represent fairly 
all the people. However, when the challenge to the stat-
ute is in effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the 
assumption can no lon9er serve as the basis for presuming 
constitutionality." lFootnote omitted.) 
I am at a loss to understand how such reasoning is at all rele-
vant to the present case. The voting qualifications at issue 
have been promulgated not by Union Free School District No. 15, 
but by the New York State Legislature, and the appellant is of 
course fully able to participate in the election of representa-
tives in that body. There is simply no claim whatever here that 
the state government is not "structured so as to represent fairly 
all the people," including the appellant. 
Nor is there any other justification for imposing the Court's 
"exacting" equal protection test. This case does not involve 
racial classifications, which in light of the genesis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment have traditionally been viewed as inherently 
"suspect. 117 And this statute is not one that impinges upon a 
constitutionally protected right, and that conse~uently can be 
justified only by a "compelling'' state interest. For "the Con-
stitution of the United States does not confer the right of suf-
frage upon any one .... " Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178. 
In any event, it seems to me that under~ equal protection 
standard, short of a doctrinaire insistence that universal suf-
frage is somehow mandated by the Constitution, the appellant's 
claim must be rejected. First of all, it must be emphasized--des-
pite the Court's undifferentiated references to what it terms 
7Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216; McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192. 
8shapiro v. Thompson, 
357 U.S. 449, 463. 
U.S. 
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. --· __ , cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 
"the franchise"--that we are dealing here n~t with~ generaJ elec-
tion, but with a limited, special-purpose election. The appel-
lant is eligible to vote in all state, local, and feqefal elec-
tions in which general governmental policy is determined. He ts 
fully able, therefore, to participate not only in the proc~sses 
by which the requirements for school district voting may be 
changed, but also in those by which the levels of state and feq-
eral financial assistance to the District are detefmined. He 
clearly is not locked into any self-perpetuating status of exclu-
sion from the electoral process.IO 
Secondly, the appellant is of course limited to asserting 
his own rights, not the purported rights of hypothetical childless 
clergymen or parents of preschool children, who neither own nor 
rent taxable property. The appellant's status is merely that of 
a citizen who says he is interested in the affairs of his local 
public schools. If the Constitution requires that he must be 
given a decision-making role in the governance of those affairs, 
then it seems to me that any individual who seeks such a role 
must be given it. For as I have suggested, there is no persuasive 
reason for distinguishing constitutionally between the voter qual-
ifications New York has required for its Union Free School Dis-
trict elections and qualifications based on factors such as age, 
residence, or literacy.11 
9special-purpose governmental authorities such as water, 
lighting, and sewer districts exist in various sections of the 
country, and participation in such districts is undoubtedly lim-
ited in many instances to those who partake of the agency's ser-
vices and are assessed for its expenses. The constitutional 
validity of such a policy is, it seems to me, unquestionable. 
And while it is true, as the appellant argues, that a school sys-
tem has a more pervasive influence in the community than do most 
other such special-purpose authorities, I cannot agree that that 
difference in degree presents anything approaching a distinction 
of constitutional dimension. 
10 
Compare Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 
713, with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. Since Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 
1J:"S'": 663, dealt with requirements for voting in general elections, 
those decisions do not control the result here. 
11A c0mparison of the classification made by New York with one 
based on literacy, for instance, presumably would attempt to 
weight the interest of the person excluded from voting against 
the reasonableness of the legislative assumption regarding his 
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Today's decision can only be viewed as irreconcilable with the 
established principle that "ft_7he States have ... broad powers 
to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage 
may be exercised .... " Since I think that principle is entirely 
sound, I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment and opi-
nion. 
CJmpetence as a voter or his connection with the subject matter 
of the election. In such a speculative analysis precision is not 
attainable for that very reason, it seems to me, the standard of 
adjudication should be a reasonably tolerant one. But even as-
suming such an analysis were attempted, it could not in my view 
justify drawing a constitutional line between the classification 
involved here and a literacy requirement. True, the appellant 
and persons in his class might be thought to have generally more 
ability to vote intelligently than do illiterates. On the other 
hand, illiterate citizens clearly have considerably more of a 
stake in the outcome of general elections than do the members of 
the appellant's class in the result of school district elections. 
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Appendix B 
No. 705.--0ctober Term, 1968. 
Joseph Q. Cipriano, 
Appellant, On Appeal From the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana. v. 
City of Houma et al. 
LJune 16, 1969_.:7 
PER CURIAM. 
In this case we must determine whether provisions of Louisi-
ana law which give only "property taxpayers" the right to vote in 
elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a 
municipal utility are constitutional. This case thus presents an 
issue similar to the one considered in Kramer v. Union Free 
School District No. 15 1 ante. With one judge dissenting, a three-
judge District Court determined that the Louisiana provisions 
were constitutional. However, as in Kramer, we find that the chal-
lenged provisions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment; we therefore reverse. 
The Louisiana Constitution provides that the legislature may 
authorize municipalities to issue bonds 11lJJ or the purpose of 
constructing, acquiring, extending or improving any revenue-pro-
ducing public utility." La. Const., Art. 14, i 14 (f). ·Pursuant 
to this provision, the legislature enacted legislation authoriz-
ing Louisiana municipalities to issue revenue bonds. La. Rev. 
Stat. § 33:4251 (1950).J/ The legislature further provided, how-
ever, that the municipalities could issue the bonds only if they 
were approved by a "majority in number and amount of the pro,gerty 
taxpayers qualified to vote ..• fwho vote at the bond electio.!Y'.•Y 
.!I The amount of debt a municipality may incur is limited by the 
Louisiana Constitution. La. Const., Art. 14, § 14 (f). These 
revenue bonds are not included in computing the municipal 
debt, however, if they are secured exclusively by a mortgage 
on the assets of the utility system and a pledge of the system 
revenues. La. Const., Art. 14, § 14 (m). 
We were informed at oral argument that "number and amount" 
means the bonds must be approved by a majority of the property 
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La. Rev. Stat. § 39:501 (1950). See also La. Rev. Stat. §§ 33: 
4258, 39:508 (1950) 
Appellee City of Houma owns and operates gas, water, and 
electric utility systems. In September 1967 the city officials 
scheduled a special election to obtain voter approval for the is-
suance of $10,000,000 of utility revenue bonds. The city planned 
{o finance extension and improvement of the municipally owned 
utility systems with the bond proceeds. At the special election 
a majority ttin number and amount" of the property taxpayers ap-
proved the bond issue. However, within the period provided by 
Louisiana law for contesting the result of the election, La. Rev. 
Stat.§ 33:4260 (1960), this suit was instituted in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 
Appellant alleged that he was a duly qualified voterY of 
the City of Houma, and that he had been prevented from voting in 
the revenue bond election solely because he was not a property 
owner. He sued for himself and for a class of 6,926 nonproperty 
taxpayers otherwise qualified as City of Houma voters. Appellant 
sought to enjoin the issuance of the bonds approved at the speci-
al election and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the limita-
tion of the franchise to property taxpayers is unconstitutional. 
A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 
§§ 2281, 2284 (1964 ed.). The court then dismissed the suit, 
finding the Louisiana provisions constitutional. Cipriano v. City 
of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823 (D. C. E. D. La. 1968). Appellant 
brought a direct appeal to this Court, 28 U.S. C. § 1253 (1964 
ed.); we noted probable jurisdiction - U. S. ---(1969). 
As we noted in Kramer, ante, if a challenged state statute 
grants the right to vote in a limited purpose election to some 
otherwise qualified voters and denies it to others,Y "the Court 
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest." Kramer v. Union Free School District 
No. 15, ante, at 6. Moreover, no less showing that the exclu-
sions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest is re-
quired merely because "the questions scheduled for the election 
need not have been submitted to the voters." Id., at 8, n. 11. 
taxpayers voting and their votes must also represent a "ma-
jority of the assessed property owned by those taxpayers who 
are actually voting." 
The qualifications are of age, residence, and registration. 
See La. Rev. Stat. § 39:508 (1950). 
Appellant does not challenge any other voter qualification 
regulations. The sole issue in this case is the constitution-
ality of the provisions of Louisiana law permitting only prop-
erty taxpayers to vote in utility bond elections. 
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The State maintains that property owners have a "special 
pecuniary interest" in the election, because the efficiency of 
the utility system directly affects "property and property val-
ues" and thus "the basic security of their investment in ,ltheiy 
property is at stake." Assuming arguendo5/ that a State might, 
in some circumstances, constitutionally limit the franchise to 
qualified voters who are also "specially interested" in the elec-
tion, whether the statute allegedly so limiting the franchise 
denies equal protection of the laws to those otherwise qualified 
voters who are excluded depends on "whether all those excluded 
are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those 
the statute includes." Id., at 11. 
At the time of the election, only about 40% of the city's 
registered voters were property taxpayers. Of course, the oper-
ation of the utility systems - gas, water, and electric - affects 
virtually every resident of the city, nonproperty owners as well 
as property owners. All users pay utility bills, and the rates 
may be affected substantially by the amount of revenue bonds 
outstanding • .§/ Certainly property owners are not alone in feel-
ing the impact of bad utility service or high rates, or in reap-
ing the benefits of good service and low rates. 
The revenue bonds are to be paid only from the operations 
of the utilities; they are not financed in any way by property 
tax revenue. Property owners, like non-property owners, use the 
utilities and pay the rates; however, the impact of the revenue 
bond issue on them is unconnected to their status as property 
taxpayers. Indeed, the benefits and burdens of the bond issue 
fall indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner 
alike. 
Moreover, the profits of the utility systems' operations 
are paid into the general fund of the city and are used to fi-
nance city services that otherwise would be supported by taxes. 
Of course, property taxpayers may be concerned with expanding 
and improving the city's utility operations; such improvements 
could produce revenues which eventually would reduce the burden 
on the property tax, to support city services. On the other hand, 
nonproperty taxpayers may feel that their interests as rate pay-
ers indicate that no further expansion of the utility's debt 
obligations should be made. Of course, these differences of opin-
As in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, ante, we 
find it unnecessary to decide whether a State might, in some 
circumstances, limit the franchise to those "primarily in-
terested." 
For example, a proposed decrease in utility rates may be fore-
stalled by the issuance of new revenue bonds. 
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ion cannot justify excluding either group from the bond election, 
when, as in this case, both are substantially affected by the 
utility operation. Fo~ as we noted in Carrington v. Rash, 380 
U.S. 89, 94 (1965), "'LfJencing out' from the franchise a sector 
of the population because of the way they may vote is constitu- · 
tionally impermissible." 
The challenged statute contains a classification which 
excludes otherwise qualified voters who are as substantially 
affected and directly interested in the matter voted upon as are 
those who are permitted to vote. When, as in this case, the 
State's sole justification for the statute is that the classifi-
cation provides a "rational basis" for limiting the franchise to 
those voters with a "special interest," the statute clearly does 
not meet the "exacting standard of precision we require of stat-
utes which selectively distribute the franchise." Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15 1 ante, at 11. We therefore 
.reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
Significant hardships would be imposed on cities, bond-
holders, and others connected with municipal utilities if our 
decision today were given full retroactive effect. Where a de-
cision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable re-
sults if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases 
for avoiding the ''injustice or hardship" by a holding of nonret-
roactivity. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining 
Co., 287 U.S. 358,364 (1932). See Chicot County Drainage Dist. 
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). Cf. Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Therefore, we will apply our deci-
sion in this case prospectively. That is, we will apply it only 
where, under state law, the time for challenging the election 
result has not expired, or in cases brought within the time 
specified by state law for challenging the election and which 
are not yet final. Thus, the decision will not apply where the 
authorization to issue the securities is legally complete on the 
date of this decision. Of course, our decision will not affect 
the validity of securities which have been sold or issued prior 
to this decision and pursuant to such final authorization. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed. The case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Steward concur in the 
judgment of the Court. Unlike Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict No. 15, ante, this case involves voting classification 
"wholly irrelevant to achievement of the State's objective. 
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comrn'rs~, 330 U.S. 552, 556. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, while adhering to his views expressed 
in dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964); Harper 
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v. Virginia Board of Election§. 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966); and 
Averfi v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968), but consider-
ing imself bound by the Court's decisions in those cases, con-
curs in the result. 
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Appendix C 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
EMILY KOLODZIEJSKI, 
Plain tiff, l 
vs. 
CITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZONA, and 
MILTON H. GRAHAM, FRANK G. 
BENITES, CHARLES CASE, JOHN J. 
LONG, MILTON SANDERS, MRS. 
DOROTHY THEILKAS, DR. MORRISON l 
F. WARREN, Members of and consti-
tuting the City Council of the 
City of Phoenix, Arizona, 
Defendants.~ __________ ) 
No. Civ-69-335 Phx. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Before: Walter Ely, Circuit Judge, and Walter E. Craig and Wm. 
P. Copple, District Judges 
PER CURIAM: 
The above entitled cause was instituted pursuant to 
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 (3) 
(4), and Title 28 U.S.C. Sections 2201 and 2202. 
Plaintiff, a resident of the City of Phoenix, within 
the District of Arizona, seeks to enjoin the City of Phoenix, a 
body politic, the Mayor and members of the City Council, from 
issuing certain bonds approved at a special election June 10, 
1969, called for that purpose. The election was duly and regu-
larly called by the City, pursuant to Article 7, Section 13 of 
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1 
the Arizona Constitution, and Title 9, Section 781, A.R.S. 
The propositions offered to the electorate were ten 
in number, the first two related to Revenue Bonds: (1) for the 
Municipal Water System, $53,900,000, (2) for the Airport and re-
lated facilities, $58,900,000. The remaining eight propositions 
related to General Obligation Bonds: (3) Sewer System, 
$37,000,000, (4) Pa~ks and Playgrounds, $9,000,000, (5) Munici-
pal Buildings, $1,000,000, (6) Fire Department, $1,200,000, (7) 
Police and Public Safety Buildings, $4,500,000, (8) Maintenance 
and Service Facilities, $1,500,000, (9) Sanitary Landfills, 
$2,250,000, (10) Library, $4,000,000. 
Pursuant to the Arizona Constitution and Statutes, 
the electorate was limited to duly qualified electors who, in 
addition, .were real property taxpayers. Plaintiff is a duly 
qualified elector of the City of Phoenix, but not a real property 
taxpayer. 
1 
Article 7, Section 13, Constitution of Arizona: 
"Questions upon bond issues or special assessments shall be sub-
mitted to the vote of real property tax payers, who shall also 
in all respects be qualified electors of this state, and of the 
political subdivisions thereof affected by such questions." 
Title 9, Section 782, A.R.S.: "When the governing 
body of an incorporated city or town determines to borrow money 
under the provisions of this article, the question of issuing 
bonds under this article shall be submitted to the real property 
taxpayers who are in all other respects qualified electors of 
the municipality. No bond shall be issued without the assent of 
a majority of such qualified electors voting at an election held· 
for that purpose as provided in this article." 
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The canvass of the election took place June 23, 1969, 
and the several propositions were declared to be carried. Under 
Arizona law the period during which an elector may contest an 
election is limited to five (5) days following the canvass of the 
election and the declaration of the results thereof. 16 A.R.S. 
1202, 1204. 
This action was instituted August 1, 1969, in this 
Court, no State action having been instituted. A Three Judge 
Court was convened to hear the matter, pursuant to Title 23 
U.S.C. Sections 2281 and 2284. The matter was submitted and 
argued to the Court upon an agreed Statement of Facts consistent 
with the foregoing statement. 
We need go no further than Kramer v. Union Free School 
District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 s. Ct. 1886, and Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S. Ct. 1897, both decided June 16, 1969. 
In Kramer, supra, the Supreme Court has held that 
State Statutory and Constitutional provisions prohibiting the 
exercise of the voting franchise to some electors, while allowing 
'it to others, must be subjected to close scrutiny to "determine 
whether the exclusi_ons are necessary to promote a compelling 
State interest." If there is no compelling State interest to be 
promoted by the exclusion, the Constitutional and Statuory provi-
sions are violative of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
As in Cipriano, supra, we find the challenged Consti-
tutional provision and the challenged Statutes under which the 
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election was held to contain "a classification which excludes 
otherwise qualified voters, who are as substantially affected and 
directly interested in the matters voted upon as those permitted 
to vote." There was no evidence before this Court which would 
justify the conclusion that the exclusions under Arizona law are 
necessary to promote a compelling State interest. Moreover, in 
the instant case we find no evidence which would justify a dis-
tinction between Revenue Bonds and General Obligation Bonds.2 
In Cipriano, supra, in order to avoid significant 
hardships on cities' bondholders and others, the Court held the 
rule of that case would be applied prospectively, "only where, 
under state law, the time for challenging the election result has 
not expired, or in cases brought within the time specified by 
state law for challenging the election and which are not yet 
final. Thus, the decision will not apply where the authorization 
to issue the securities is legally complete on the date of this· 
decision." 
In the instant case the authorization to issue secur-
ities was not legally complete by June 16, 1969, {the date of 
the Cipriano decision) nor had the time expired within which the 
election could have been contested. In the instant case we find 
the Arizona Constitutional and Statutory exclusions involved in 
2 The defendants concede that Kramer and Cipriano re-
quire that the election be invalidated insofar as it authorized 
the issuance of Revenue Bonds. 
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the election called by the City of Phoenix and held June 10 
1969, to be violative of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants will be permanently 
enjoined from the issuance of any securities purportedly author-
ized by the challenged election, and the plaintiff's counsel will 
submit a proposed form of judgment. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 1969. 
United States Circuit Judge 
United States District(.:y'dge 
/if'Yr/(&l;/!t~ - ------ . __ r!iii.~--,-.-~-
Un i ted States Dist~ict Judge 
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Appendix D 
Colorado Bond Issues Blocked From Sale 
By Present Market Conditions 
Issues Already Authorized and Ready to be Marketed 
1) Aurora School District ••••.•....••••••.•••.••.• $4,500,000 
(Population - 77,000) 
2) Littleton School District •••.••.•.••••.•••••••• $2,100,000 
(Population - 55,000) 
3) Adams County School District No. 1 ••••.•••••••• 
(Population - 19,000) 
$ 800,000 
4) Adams County School District No. 12 ••..•••.•••• $1,000,000 
(Population - 37,500) 
5) Boulder Valley School District •••••.•.••.••.••• $8,000,000 
(Population - 85,000) 
6) Harrison School District, El Paso County ..••••. $2,200,000 
(Population - 15,500) 
7) Air Force Academy School District •.••••••••••.• 
El Paso County , 






Colorado Bond Issues Blocked From Sale 
By Present Market Conditions 
Issues Planned and to be Authorized by Election in Near Future 
1) Jefferson County School District •••••••••••••• $25,000,000 
(Population - 213,000) 
2) Greeley School District ••••••••••••••••••••••• $ 3,500,000 
(Population - 35,000) 









City of Denver •••••••• ~ •••••••••••••.••••••••• $ 5,300,000 
(Population - 500,000) 
Pueblo County School District No. 70 •••••••••• $ 1,200,000 
(Population - 14,500) 
Loveland School District •••••••••••••••••••••• $ 6,700,000 
(Population - 19,250) 
Fort Collins School District •••.••••••••.••••• $18,500,000 
(Population - 37,000) 
Creede School District .•.•••••.••••••••••••••. $ 325,000 
(Population - 1,000) 
Eagle County School District •••••••••.••.•••.• $ 3,600,000 
(Population - ?,000) 
Delta School District ••••••••••••.••••.•••••.. $ 3,150,000 
(Population - 10,000) 
11) Pueblo School District ••••••••••••••••••••••.• $ 16,000,000 
(Population - 125,000) 
Total $123,275,000 
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